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Abstract: To maintain nominal flight control system functionalities during fault scenarios,
enhancements of the state-of-practise angle of attack and airspeed sensor fault accommodation
strategies are presented. The strategy combines a fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) system
with a robust fault tolerant control law. The FDD system allows to maintain the nominal flight
control law as long as at least one angle of attack and airspeed sensor are available. The FDD
system is designed using advanced nullspace computation, optimization, and signal processing
techniques. For the scenario of a total airspeed measurement loss, an airspeed independent
longitudinal backup control law is designed using global optimization techniques. Using this law
avoids the state-of-practise switch to a direct law in which the pilot must control the elevator
positions directly. The results from an extensive industrial validation and verification campaign
are reported.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) as well as fault toler-
ant control (FTC) approaches were pragmatically pursued
to establish a maximum degree of safety and reliability.
For the new generation of aircraft this pragmatic design
paradigm has been raised to a performance-oriented one
which can be termed as full-time and all-event availability
of performance-optimized guidance, navigation and con-
trol (GNC) functions Goupil et al. (2015). Such a robust
provision of GNC functions can be translated in the desire
to assist the pilot in all possible scenarios to keep the flight
safe, making the flight task itself easier and the mission
optimal. A high level description of this idea is given in
Figure 1. In fault scenarios, which are indicated by the
red dots in the figure, it may be necessary to downgrade
to a control law with less GNC functionality. This can
be, for example, due to the unavailability of a certain
sensor signal or actuator. Such a degradation is referred
to moving from the normal law, i.e. nominal functionality,
to an alternate law, providing limited functionality. In the
worst case scenario, the pilot will fly the so called direct
law, where the pilot directly controls the control surface of
the aircraft. The flight in the direct law shall be avoided,
as in this law the pilot has to focus most of the attention
on the piloting task. Thus, current FDD/FTC research is
focused on the situational extension of the nominal GNC
functionality level in case of faults. This is illustrated by
1 The research of this paper was performed by the author when af-
filiated with the German Aerospace Center, DLR Oberpfaffenhofen.
moving the purple line (current situation) of degradation
to the right (desired situation).
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Fig. 1. Illustration of GNC functionality extension idea
To achieve high GNC functionality in case of faults, the
key enablers have been identified to be advanced FDD and
FTC, which can contribute to the future more sustainable
aircraft Goupil et al. (2015). Early and robust detection
of incipient faults thanks to advanced FDD is required to
extend the availability of key flight parameters and thereby
maintain the nominal GNC functionality level. In case
of a loss of key flight parameters FTC allows to improve
the flight control system (FCS) functionality to get closer
to its nominal level. Two key flight parameters required
to ensure the highest possible FCS functionality level is
the aircraft’s angle of attack (AoA) and its calibrated
airspeed (VCAS). While the latter is used to schedule the
control gains and thus highly influences the performance
and stability of the aircraft, the first is used to protect
the aircraft from reaching stall conditions. Due to their
importance for the FCS, we propose two main algorithms
to enhance the state-of-practice VCAS and AoA sensor
fault accommodation strategy: an advanced FDD system
to monitor the triplex redundant VCAS and AoA measure-
ments as well as an alternate longitudinal control law, a so-
called backup law, independent of the two measurements.
The advanced FDD system enhances current state-of-
practice to be able to isolate multiple sensor faults. The
state-of-practice monitoring scheme is able to cope with a
single fault scenario in the triplex redundant measurement
system Berdjag et al. (2013) and switches to an alternate
or even direct law in case of more than one fault. The
presented FDD system allows maintaining the normal
law, i.e. the nominal longitudinal control law and all
protections, as long as one sensor in each of the two triplex
redundant measurements is still working . In case of a total
loss of the VCAS measurements the state-of-practice fault
accommodation strategy initiates a switch to the direct
law, where the pilot directly controls the elevators via his
stick actions. For this scenario a newly developed backup
law is presented. This backup law operates the aircraft
without using VCAS for scheduling and keeps the stability
and performance level close to the normal law.
The tackled problem is part of the EU-FP7 RECONFIG-
URE project on FDD/FTC techniques for modern civil
aircraft. Valuable contributions dealing with the same or
parts of the defined problem can be found in literature:
In Rosa et al. (2015) a mixed-µ FDD/FTC approach is
proposed, in Hardier et al. (2015) an online parameter
estimation algorithm to recover lost measurements is ap-
plied, in Wan et al. (2016) a moving horizon estimation
techniques for the FDD problem is used, in Chen et al.
(2015) sliding mode observers to tackle the sensor FDD
problem are developed, and in Hartley and Maciejowski
(2015) a fault tolerant longitudinal law based on model
predictive control is presented. In the approach in this
paper the combined FDD/FTC problem is tacked. The use
of signal together with model based fault detection tech-
niques as well as the use of global optimization techniques
differentiates the presented approach from the mentioned
contributions. These techniques allow the design of an
FDD/FTC system with increased performance. To show
this, the final part of the paper deals with the reporting
of the latest results of an extensive industrial validation
and verification campaign set up in the RECONFIGURE
project.
2. FAULT ACCOMMODATION STRATEGY
Up to three AoA and three VCAS faults result in various
different fault scenarios to be dealt with. In this section
a summary of the strategy coping with these scenarios is
given. In Table 1 possible fault scenarios and its accommo-
dation strategies are listed. As long as one of the AoA and
VCAS sensors are properly working, the nominal control
law together with its full protection functionality can be
maintained. This extends the state of practice capability,
which can only deal with a single sensor in every triplex
redundant measurement.
In case of a total loss of the AoA sensors, an alternate
law, namely the nominal control law without direct AoA
protections is activated. This alternate law is state of prac-
tice and should not be confused with the herein developed
backup law. The backup law, independent of VCAS, is
activated in case of a total loss of the VCAS sensors. It pro-
vides satisfactory handling qualities and avoids the switch
to the direct control law, but does not include direct AoA
protections. This fault accommodation strategy is also
coherent with another main design constraints, namely to
keep the nominal control law and protections in operation
as long as possible.
Scenario Running algorithms
fault free nominal control law and protections
1 or 2 AoA sensors fail fault isolation and use of
remaining AoA sensor to maintain
nominal control law and protections
1 or 2 VCAS sensors fail fault isolation and use of
remaining VCAS sensor to maintain
nominal control law and protections
3 AoA sensors fail switch to alternate law which
includes nominal control law
but without direct AoA protections
3 VCAS sensors fail or switch to a VCAS independent
all 6 sensors fail longitudinal backup law
Table 1. Fault accommodation strategy
Note, in case of further or other failures, as for example
the loss of the inertial measurement unit or the loss of
flight control computers, it might still be necessary to the
activate the direct law. However, the presented approach
helps to extend the provision of high GNC functionality
levels during VCAS and AoA faults.
3. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION SYSTEM
FOR ROBUSTLY MONITORING AOA AND VCAS
As the FDD system needs to be able to detect and
isolate the faulty sensors, i.e. locate which sensors are
faulty, each of the six air data sensors (three for AoA
and three for VCAS) are monitored without the use
of the other five sensors. In this way it is possible to
avoid a coupling between the faults and directly solve the
fault isolation problem. This is schematically shown for
a triplex redundant sensor system in Fig. 2. Each of the
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Fig. 2. FDD system monitoring a triplex sensor system
six fault detection subsystems consist of a model based
and a signal based component as depicted in Fig. 3. By
signal based methods we refer to methods which process
only the measurement signal. By model based methods
we refer to methods which make use of a mathematical
description of the underlying system. The combination
of signal and model based methods enables to reliably
detect and isolate the faulty sensors. Each of the FDD
subsystems generates a decision variable i for each sensor,
which indicates if the sensor is working correctly (is,k = 1)
or not (is,k = 0), where s ∈ {α, V CAS} and k = 1, 2, 3.
With this knowledge available, the state-of practice signal
consolidation scheme, which provides a weighted median
in case of no fault, a mean based calculation in case of two
faults, and a constant value in case of more than one fault,
can be enhanced to
αc =

g1α˜+ g2(min(α) + max(α)) if Si = 3
1
Si
3∑
k=1
αkiα,k if 3 > Si ≥ 1
c otherwise.
(1)
In (1) αc is the consolidate AoA value, α is a vector
containing the three AoA measurement signals α1, α2
and α3, α˜ is the median value of three measurements,
Si = iα,1 + iα,2 + iα,3 indicates how many sensors work
correctly, and c is a constant value which is propagated in
case of a total loss. The weights g1 and g2 are selected
to weight the median value against the two remaining
sensors, while g1 + 2g2 = 1 needs to be fulfilled. This
consolidation scheme enhances the state-of-practice by
providing a correct value in case of two faults. Note, it
maintains the state-of practice functionality in fault free
and single fault scenarios.
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Fig. 3. FDD system to monitor one AoA sensor based on
signals and model based components
3.1 Signal based component
Signal based fault detection approaches assume that the
available signals contain information which directly indi-
cates the presence of faults. The main advantage of such a
signal processing based methods is their reduced complex-
ity. One implemented methods is simple limit checking on
the absolute measurement value as well as its derivative.
Further, plausibility checks, checking if in presence of a
changing input signal a changing output signal is present,
are used. Finally, a recursive version of discrete Fourier
transformation has been developed to be able to detect
unwanted oscillations in the signals. A detailed description
of all these algorithms can be found in Ossmann and Joos
(2016), where they are applied for the AoA measurement
signals. For the VCAS and the AoA monitoring the same
algorithms are used, however, with an adapted parameter
setting.
3.2 Model based component
The model based component uses linear filters to generate
a so called residual signal, which shall be zero (or suf-
ficiently small) in all fault free cases, while it needs to
be nonzero in case of faults. For the generation of these
linear filters a two step approach is used: The first step
uses linear model of the underlying dynamics to deter-
mine an adequate structure of the residual filter based on
nullspace computations tailored for FDD purposes. Theo-
retical details about this approach can be found in Varga
(2003) with an extension on how to select the nullspace
basis vectors to increase robustness against uncertainties
in Ossmann and Joos (2016). The second step is an update
of the filter parameters based on non-convex optimization
techniques and generated simulation data using the non-
linear high fidelity model. The optimization approach is
based on the theoretical descriptions in Ossmann (2014).
Due to the fact that this paper focuses on combining the
FDD and FTC algorithms as well as the validation and
verification results the description of FDD system is only
summarized briefly here. Readers interested in the FDD
part can find more details about its background and its
development in Ossmann and Joos (2016).
4. AN ALTERNATE BACKUP CONTROL LAW TO
RETAIN PILOTING EASINESS
For the design of a backup robust longitudinal controller
to be used in the case of failure of all velecoity sensors, we
use an optimization based multi-objective tuning approach
of the controller parameters as described in Joos (1999).
The controller structure must be rich enough to allow the
required performance and robustness.
Important features of the chosen methodology are that
various kinds of design objectives can be taken into ac-
count in their most natural form via appropriately for-
mulated mathematical criteria (e.g., initial response, over-
shoot, settling time). The main appeal of the multi-
objective optimization, as a computer aided design tech-
nique, is its ability to handle several (potentially) con-
flicting design goals simultaneously, and finding the best
compromising solution. This technique can also serve for
robustness assessment purposes, by finding “worst-case”
parameter combinations to decide whether a design is
robust or not.
Robustness of the controller to be designed can be achieved
in several ways by appropriately mapping of the robustness
requirements onto design criteria. The local robustness of
the controller in the vicinity of a design point can be en-
forced by defining suited robustness criteria, which directly
address robustness to not-modeled parametric variations
(e.g., ensuring sufficient gain/phase margins). Global ro-
bustness against parametric variations (e.g., weight and/or
center of gravity position) can be addressed using mul-
tiple models representing different operating conditions.
This automatically leads to multiple-model multi-criteria
design problem formulations. The design criteria (or con-
straints) are evaluated as the worst-case value over the
whole range of a selected representative model set. Herein
robustness is covered using such a multi-model approach.
Further, stability is enforced by a specific time response
constraint.
For a mathematical description of the optimization, let
ci(θ, ρ), i ∈ I (e.g., I = {1, . . . , Nc}) be a set of criteria
depending on the tuning parameters θ ∈ Θ and uncertain
parameters ρ ∈ Π. The admissible tuning parameter
space is defined by Θ and Π is the set of uncertain
parameter values. For example, a discrete-set as Π =
{ρ(1), . . . , ρ(N)} may account for a multiple-model based
problem formulation. The problem of finding satisfactory
compromise solutions for the tuning variable θ in presence
of uncertainties in ρ, we can solve a scalar weighted min-
max optimisation problem of the form
min
θ∈Θ
max
i∈Is,ρ∈Π
{
ci(θ, ρ)
di
}
,
subject to max
ρ∈Π
ci(θ, ρ) ≤ di for i ∈ I \ Is,
(2)
where for the i-th criterion, the weighting factors di > 0
can be interpreted either as demand (or soft constraint)
for i ∈ Is or a hard constraint for i ∈ I \ Is. The above
min-max multi-criteria optimisation problem has been
reformulated as a smooth nonlinear programming problem
(NLP) with inequalities and simple bounds constraints and
solved by using available solvers as those presented in Joos
et al. (2002).
For the structure of the longitudinal controller we rely on
proven approaches like the C∗-control law as described
in Brockhaus et al. (2011). It was augmented by con-
stant pitch rate and pitch acceleration feedback yielding
a common command and stability augmentation system
CAS/SAS. The challenge was to find proper constant
controller gains, without scheduling, to make it robust
against operational variations. The according control law
equations are given by
x˙ = [θ1 θ2 0 θ3]u
η = x+ [θ4 θ5 θ6 0]u,
(3)
where the input vector u consists of pitch rate q, load factor
nz, pitch acceleration q˙, and the commanded load factor
nz,ref. η is the generated elevator deflection command.
The free tuning parameters of this control law structure
are the elements of θ1 to θ6. For tuning of the controller
parameters a multi-objective, multi-model optimization,
as briefly described above, has been set up with the full
non-linear benchmark model in order to fully cover the
overall operational range of the aircraft, including non-
clear configurations.
The complete set of criteria used for design is described in
Table 2, q0 is the pitch rate trim value, nz0 the load factor
trim value, Θ the pitch angle of the aircraft, and tend the
simulation time.
Description Type Basic formula
pitch rate
m
in
im
iz
ed
maxt(q(t)− q0)overshoot
load factor
maxt(nz(t)− nz0 )overshoot
load factor
arg mint(|nz(t)| ≥ 0.95 maxt |nz(t)|)rise time
load factor set- ∫ tend
tend−3
(nz(t)− nz,ref)2dτpoint deviation
load factor
co
n
st
ra
in
t
maxt>tend−3 |dnz(t)/dt|steady state
pitch steady
maxt>tend−3 |d2Θ(t)/dt2|state (stability)
Table 2. Applied design criteria.
The command performance is illustrated in Fig. 4. Here
for more than 220 points in the operational range, in-
cluding non-clear configurations, the load factor response
due to a doublet stick input with small amplitude (13% of
maximum stick deflection) is depicted, showing a reason-
able homogeneity of the responses with sufficiently good
rise time and stationarity. The achieved results of the
backup controller are comparable to the one of the baseline
controller depicted in Fig. 5. To point out again this is
achieved without the use of any scheduling variables.
To check robustness and stability of the controller, which
was designed using non-linear simulations only, gain and
phase margins at 214 trim cases have been computed. The
open loop transfer functions of the aircraft, sensor actuator
dynamics together with the backup law were generated on
these points to be able to determine the stability margins.
The results are shown in Fig. 6. Gain margins not less than
6dB and phase margins of at least 60◦ could be achieved
indicating satisfactory robustness to uncertainties. Note
again, that no criteria based on gain and phase margins
have been applied during the design, making the margin
tests reasonable verification criteria.
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Fig. 4. Backup controller nz responses to stick doublet
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Fig. 5. Baseline controller nz responses to stick doublet.
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Fig. 6. Open loop gain and phase margins.
5. INDUSTRIAL VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
RESULTS
The subsequently performed industrial V&V activities are
part of a typical aircraft industrial development process.
An important prerequisite is the implementation of the
developed algorithms on the flight control computer of
the fly-by-wire aircraft system environment. A graph-
ical tool has been used to specify the block diagram
structure of the algorithms. In contrast to the equivalent
Matlab/Simulink-based block diagram modeling, only a
limited set of certified elementary blocks is available. How-
ever, this limited set represents a set of certifiable code,
which can be used on a flight control computer.
5.1 Test procedure
Various test scenarios have been defined to assess FDI
performance and controller performance in case of loss of
at least 2 sensors of AoA or VCAS including:
• Full forward and back stick input, also in combination
with max or min thrust to test performance for
extreme values of Nz or AoA.
• Responses to vertical gusts as well as head and tail
shear winds.
• Fault detection performance in typical cruise maneu-
vering conditions including very long flights.
• Auto pilot modes, like flight path angle or vertical
speed step commands.
• Random pilot input for stick and thrust command.
For all scenarios a Monte-Carlo like parameter study was
performed for a prescribed set of flight conditions and
randomly chosen sensor fault events. The flight envelope
is defined between 5000 ft to 41000 ft, from minimum
selectable speed to maximum speed and weight, and a
center of gravity position between 28 % and 44 %. The
fault occurrence time is selected between 5 s and 90 % of
the overall simulation time.
All simulations have been performed twice: a first cam-
paign without sensor faults validates the robustness of
the FDD-system against false alarms; a second campaign
with sensor faults validates the detection performance and
controller performance after fault events. Most of the test
scenarios are related to flight envelope protection tests not
suitable to test the backup law. The auto pilot scenario
however can serve as a test scenario for a piloted flight
allowing to validate the performance of our backup law.
5.2 FDD results
The robustness validation is performed without any faults
injected, thus validating if false alarms may appear. The
performance analysis deals with fault scenarios, thus calcu-
lating the rate of missed detection and the detection time.
Various maneuvers, including pilot inputs with different
amplitudes, wind inputs with different wind velocities and
gradients, turbulence inputs, wind shear as well as auto-
pilot maneuvers are tested. No false alarms were encoun-
tered in around 3000 simulations runs. The validation
step of the detectability performance of the FDD system
includes various fault scenarios. Not a single missed de-
tection has been encountered in the repeated 3000 runs
with faults. The detection time performance resulted in a
mean detection value of 0.87 s, a minimum of 0.04 s and a
maximum of 11.04 s. These results allow a satisfactory fast
adaptation of the FCS.
5.3 FTC results
To illustrate that safe flight could be continued after
detected loss of all velocity sensors by means of the backup
law, an auto pilot scenario is selected (alternative to a
piloted flight after detection). The auto pilot is in flight
path angle mode. Wind gusts and turbulence are also
applied in this scenario (after 100 s). Note that protections
are irrelevant for these scenarios. However, the activation
due to undetected faults still has to be avoided. All sensor
faults are detected within 3.04 s with a mean detection
time of 0.85 s.
Fig. 7 illustrates how the commanded flight path angle is
recovered after the fault events, which occur between 19 s
and 47 s. Due to the fast detection and reconfiguration, the
maximum error in the flight path over all 10 simulations is
below 2 deg. For comparison, the time responses without
sensor faults are depicted in Fig. 8. The comparison
illustrates the strong influence of the faulty signal until
detection and clearly demonstrates the necessity of a
fast and reliable fault detection. Table 3 lists the types
and numbers of faulty sensors applied during the auto
piloted simulations. In 3 of the 10 simulations plotted the
controller has been reconfigured to the backup law. The
AoA and VCAS sensors are totally lost in 3 cases each.
At most 2 sensors of AoA or VCAS are faulty in 5 cases,
showing that the proposed signal consolidation is sufficient
to continue the flight with the original baseline controller.
Similar results could be achieved for vertical speed mode
of the auto pilot, demonstrating again the possibility to
proceed auto pilot flight or to continue piloted flight at an
augmented level. In Fig. 9 the vertical speed responses are
compared for a nominal flight and a flight where all AoA
and VCAS sensors are lost. A bias is applied on all sensors
(about 20◦ on AoA, 160 kts on VCAS) at time 41 s. The
faults are detected immediately after 0.08 s (2 sampling
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Fig. 7. Auto pilot flight in flight path angle mode, at least
2 AoA or VCAS sensors are lost during flight.
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Fig. 8. Fault free Auto pilot flight (flight path angle mode).
No. of faults
Fault type AoA VCAS
Noise 2 2
Oscillation 3 2
Freeze 3 3
Bias 2/2 2/3
Runaway 3/2/2 0/2/0
Non-return to zero 2/2 2/3
Table 3. Simulated fault types
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Fig. 9. Auto pilot flight with all sensors lost compared to
nominal flight (vertical speed mode).
times) the controller is reconfigured and the flight can be
continued. The results of Fig. 9 also illustrate how severe
the disturbance in vertical speed can be even though the
reconfiguration starts already after 0.08 s.
6. CONCLUSION
Two main enhancement of the state-of-practice fault ac-
commodation strategies in modern civil aircraft for the
case of angle of attack and airspeed sensor faults have
been presented. The sensor fault diagnosis capabilities
are enhanced to multiple fault scenarios. The presented
backup control law independent of the velocity measure-
ments providing satisfactory handling qualities in case of
a total velocity measurement loss. According results of an
extensive verification and validation campaign have been
reported. The presented approach supports to achieve the
goal of full-time and all-event availability of performance-
optimized guidance, navigation and control functions.
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